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Abstract—This paper introduces a case study that involves 
data leakage in a bank applying the so-called Thinging Machine 
(TM) model. The aim is twofold: (1) Presenting a systematic 
conceptual framework for the leakage problem that provides a 
foundation for the description and design of a data leakage 
system. (2) The aim in (1) is developed in the context of 
experimentation with the TM as a new methodology in modeling. 
The TM model is based on slicing the domain of interest (a part 
of the world) to reveal data leakage. The bank case study 
concentrates on leakage during internal operations of the bank. 
The leakage spots are exposed through surveying data territory 
throughout the bank. All streams of information flow are 
identified, thus points of possible leakage can be traced with 
appropriate evidence. The modeling of flow may uncover 
possible hidden points of leakage and provide a base for a 
comprehensive information flow policy. We conclude that a TM 
based on the Heideggerian notion of thinging can serve as a 
foundation for early stages of software development and as an 
alternative approach to the dominant object-orientation 
paradigm. 
Keywords—Thinging; bank system; abstract machine; 
software development cycle; heidegger 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In software engineering, models have a central role in 
achieving a high level of reliability in the design, development, 
and deployment of systems. Specifically, in this context, we 
are interested in utilizing a conceptual model, the Thinging 
Machine (TM); reviewed in the next section), for the 
specification of the early phase of the life cycle of development 
in software systems. Without loss of generality, we focus on 
the problem of leakage of data. Accordingly, our aim is 
twofold:  
1) Presenting a systematic conceptual framework for the 
leakage problem that provides a foundation for the description 
and design of a data leakage system. The framework is applied 
to an actual bank system. 
2) The aim in (1) is developed in the context of 
experimentation with TM as a new methodology in modeling 
side by side with other methodologies such as object 
orientation. We will discuss the justification for pursuing such 
a venture later in this section.  
A. Background about Information Leakage 
Information or data (the terms are used interchangeably) 
leakage has a major impact on the business of many 
organizations today because valuable data are at risk of loss 
and possible exposure. The risks include loss of revenue and 
loss of credibility with customers, shareholders, or society. 
―Data leakage poses serious threats to organizations, including 
significant reputational damage and financial losses‖ [1]. The 
volume of data leakage has surpassed all expectations, mostly 
due to processing approaches where enterprises now centrally 
collect data, instead of keeping data details in various branches, 
thus maximizing big data benefits. [2]. 
According to [3], information leakage represents one of 
―the most common, but misunderstood, security risks faced by 
business and government alike.‖ Firewalls, intrusion detection 
tools, and intrusion prevention mechanisms are deployed—
―yet, the perception of the secure perimeter may be at odds 
with reality‖ [3]. ―Despite a plethora of research efforts on 
safeguarding sensitive information from being leaked, it 
remains an active research problem‖ [1]. According to 
Lachniet [4], it is difficult to identify the requirements for data 
loss prevention, as well as ―to whom and how they apply, and 
how to address them in a cost effective manner.‖ 
The 2017 Global Data Leakage Report [5], which is based 
on public information, includes the following data: 
 The number of leaks increased by 37%.  
 60.5% of intruders were internal. 
 50.3% of violators were employees. 
Information leakage is also a major concern to asset 
managers. In a recent survey, 35% of respondents claimed that 
information leakage represents the majority of their transaction 
costs. ―Unfortunately, information leakage is hard to measure 
and harder to attribute to specific venues and behaviors‖ [6]. It 
is reported that 63% of the grayware (potentially unwanted 
programs that are not malicious and not viruses) applications in 
2017 leaked phone numbers and 37% revealed the physical 
locations of phones [7].  
Information leakage is a type of system vulnerability where 
sensitive data is released and such data can be useful for 
attackers to breach system security. A sample case of the 
problem is shown in the following scenario. 
In many cases, the broker receiving the order is not the 
same broker who goes on to execute it on the chosen venue(s). 
As the originating broker, you give up control as soon as you 
pass an order on to another broker for execution. You do not 
necessarily know the route your client’s order is taking, or how 
many other parties might get sight of that order—and how 
much information about that order leaks out—before it 
eventually hits the market. [8] 
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Another sample of information leakage involves printing 
devices. It was found that when a new printer was installed 
with large internal hard drives, accessible via IP, it retained 
information after printing jobs were completed, but it was not 
at all secure [3]. Leakage of information may not necessarily 
involve ―loss‖ in the sense of depriving a victim from such a 
resource. 
A third example is a 2009 case reported in the newspapers 
as follows. A member of parliament in Kuwait claimed he was 
in possession of hard evidence of financial irregularities by the 
prime minister. The lawmaker produced a $700,000 check 
signed by the prime minister favoring a former MP. The MP 
demanded to know the reason for handing the check to the 
lawmaker, insinuating possibilities of corruption. The prime 
minister’s lawyer said he would file lawsuits against the MP 
for breaching bank confidentiality laws. The bank has also said 
it would file lawsuits against the MP and any employee who 
was involved in giving him a copy of the check. 
Data leakage can happen because of internal and external 
breaches, either intentionally or inadvertently. It is reported 
that internal employees account for 43% of corporate data 
leakage, and half of these leaks are accidental [9]. ―Accidental 
leaks mainly result from unintentional activities due to poor 
business process such as failure to apply appropriate 
preventative technologies and security policies, or employee 
oversight‖ [1].  
Data leak prevention is the process of monitoring sensitive 
information, enforcing data handling policies, and assessing 
incidents of leakage. It is a strategy to ensure that such 
information does not reach the wrong hands during internal 
operations of an enterprise, either during communication 
outside it. The case study in this paper focuses on the former 
type of leakage. 
Data leak prevention also refers to the use of technology 
products that assist in controlling the transferred data. 
According to Lachniet [4], ―we must be concerned about 
controlling our sensitive data throughout its entire life-cycle 
(from creation to destruction).‖ Current approaches to data leak 
prevention systems are designed as risk reduction tools for 
specific hardware/software systems. Hardware/software 
platforms are installed on network links to analyze traffic for 
unauthorized transmissions, and they run on end-user servers 
that monitor data flow between users. 
Many technical methods are used for leakage in enterprises 
[10]. For example, in relational databases, access behaviors are 
modelled in order to identify intrusions and detect data 
breaches [11]. Security data policies and traffic inspection can 
be utilized to protect sensitive information in communication 
and storage [12]. A typical tool used to handle data leakage is 
watermarking, where a unique code is implanted in the 
information container. Watermarks may require some 
alteration of the data and can sometimes destroy data. 
Moreover, the distributer (original owner) may have partners or 
may outsource where the data requires being shared [13].  
B. Aim and Approach with Regard to Information Leakage 
We study the prospect that data has leaked along several 
points of the flow path, and we propose a flow-based model 
that facilitates the identification of leakages. The aim is to 
identify and monitor unintentional or deliberate disclosure of 
information in order to take appropriate steps to prevent any 
leak in enterprise environment. 
In our proposed system, all streams of information flow are 
identified, thus pointing to potential leakages that can be traced 
with appropriate evidence. This modeling of flow may uncover 
possible hidden points of leakage and provide a base for a 
comprehensive information flow policy. For example, it can be 
used to draw the specification of the privileges of 
administrators and employees and the internal information flow 
among them.  
C. Aim with Regard to Exploring a New Modeling 
Methodology 
As mentioned previously, presenting a systematic 
conceptual framework for the data leakage problem is 
developed in the context of experimentation with a TM as a 
new methodology in modeling, alongside other methodologies 
such as object orientation. Many researchers have extended the 
use of object-oriented software design languages such as UML 
in order to apply them at the conceptual level (e.g., [14]). 
Although the huge development efforts and time that have been 
invested in UML and object-orientation-based studies, tools 
and mechanisms are marvelous achievements, this ought not be 
considered as the final word and should not discourage new 
research such as TM that points in other directions or may 
enrich the object-oriented paradigm itself.  
The TM model is a diagrammatic language that is founded 
on slicing the domain of interest (a part of the world) to ―bring 
out‖ things so that we can perceive them (nearness [15]) 
through thinging (presencing [15]) and describes how these 
things behave. According to Malafouris [16], humans evolve 
by creating new things, which in turn transform the ways we 
sense the world. ―This applies to the modern forager of digital 
information as it applies to the Paleolithic hunter-gatherer and 
tool-maker‖ [16].  
The notion of a thing and thinging in general plays an 
important role in modeling, contending with the salience of the 
widely acclaimed significance of the word object, the term 
currently in vogue among most software engineers. Heidegger 
[15] analyzed what makes a thing different from an object; a 
thing is self-sustained, self-supporting, or independent—
something that stands on its own. The condition of being self-
supporting transpires by means of producing the thing. On the 
other hand, objects are things locked into their final forms, 
closed in upon themselves: ―It is as though they had turned 
their backs on us‖ [17]. Ingold [17] described the difference: 
Using a square of paper, matchstick bamboo, ribbon, tape, 
glue and twine, it is easy to make a kite. Indoors, we were 
assembling an object. [In] a field outside, they suddenly leaped 
into action, twirling, spinning, nose-diving, and—just 
occasionally—flying. The kite that had lain lifeless on the table 
indoors had become a kite-in-the-air. It was no longer an 
object, if indeed it ever was, but a thing. As the thing exists in 
its thinging, so the kite-in-the-air exists in its flying. [17] 
TM takes thinging as a basic conceptualization notion. TM 
modeling consists of an arrangement of machines, wherein 
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each thing has its unique stream of flow. TM modeling puts 
together all of the things/machines required to assemble a 
system (a grand machine). Accordingly, an additional aim of 
this paper is to explore the TM model capabilities in 
developing the notion of information leakage. 
In the next section, we present a review of the TM model 
(also called the Flow thing model) as it is introduced in several 
publications [18-24]. The example in the section is a new 
contribution. Section 3 focuses on our case study of a bank as a 
thing. Applying TM to data leakage is the topic of section 4. 
II. THINGING MACHINE 
According to Richard [25], diagramming is a thinking tool 
that transforms abstract issues into intelligible and actionable 
forms. TM modelling utilizes an abstract thinging machine 
(hereafter, machine) with five stages of thinging as shown 
diagrammatically in Fig. 1. A thing things; that is, a thing 
creates, processes, receives, releases, and transfers things. A 
machine that handles things is itself a thing that is handled by 
other machines, as illustrated in Fig. 2 (left). Fig. 2 (right) 
shows the snake as a machine that processes a frog and 
simultaneously as a thing that flows to an owl. The TM model 
is a grand thing/machine that forms the thinging of a system. 
Thinging here refers to the creation, processing, receiving, 
releasing, and/or transferring of the system (grand machine) or 
any of its submachines. 
 
Fig. 1. Thinging Machine 
Accordingly, a thing is a machine that manifests itself in 
the stages of creation, processing, receiving, releasing, and/or 
transferring, as shown in Fig. 1. The stages in the machine can 
be briefly described as follows. 
Arrive: A thing flows to a new machine (e.g., packets 
arrive at a buffer in a router). 
Accept: A thing enters a flow machine; for simplification 
purposes, we assume that all arriving things are accepted; 
hence, we can combine arrive and accept as the receiving 
stage. 
Release: A thing is marked as ready to be transferred 
outside the machine (e.g., in an airport, passengers wait to 
board after passport clearance). 
Process (change): A thing changes its form, but not its 
―identity‖ (e.g., a number changes from binary to 
hexadecimal). 
Create: A new thing is born in a machine (e.g., a logic 
deduction system deduces a conclusion). 
Transfer: A thing is input or output in/out of a machine.  
TM includes one additional notation—triggering (denoted 
by dashed arrow)—that initiates a flow from one machine to 
another. 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of things that are machines and vice versa 
Example: In contrast to object modeling, a state in TM is a 
thing with its own machine. Consider the classical object-
oriented modeling of a coffee mug [26]. In object-oriented 
modeling, a coffee mug is an object with two states: empty and 
filled. TM takes a less abstracted view and considers a state as 
a submachine of a machine, as shown in Fig. 3. A mug (circle 
1 in the figure) is a machine that involves the flow of coffee (2) 
that triggers the creation of the two states (3 and 4).  
In such a scenario, we can identify four mutually exclusive 
events, as shown in Fig. 4. An event is a machine that is 
defined in terms of a time submachine and a region 
submachine (in addition to other machines). This notion of 
time as a thing/machine is not far from the Platonic view of 
time as a moveable image of eternity. Accordingly, the relevant 
events in the example are as follows: 
Event a (Ea): Coffee is poured into the mug. 
Event b (Eb): The mug is filled. 
Event c (Ec): Coffee is poured out of the mug. 
Event d (Ed): The mug is empty. 
Accordingly, the behavior of the coffee/mug system is 
described as shown in Fig. 4. Any of the four events can be 
taken as the initial event. In the figure, time flow (transfer → 
receive → process [takes its course] → release → transfer) is 
not shown. 
 
Fig. 3. The diagram of the system that involves filled and empty mug 
 
Fig. 4. Events 
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III. BANK AS A THING 
In this section, our study focuses on a bank as a thing. The 
bank banks through customers, other financial institutions, 
government agencies, and so forth. As these bank things 
encounter one another, the involved flows of different 
things/machines are interwoven and bundled together in a 
meshwork. The bank, in this picture, is a certain gathering 
together of the threads of the business world. It is modeled as a 
machine with many streams of flows that gather together the 
threads of banking.  
In such a view, the bank switches from the usual perception 
of being an object to a ―liveable‖ [17] thing that creates, 
processes, receives, releases, and/or transfers things. 
Remember, to objectify is to break a thing down into 
increasingly smaller parts instead of taking it holistically as it 
is. It is the ―lifeless‖ kite object, as mentioned previously, that 
is viewed as a square of paper, matchstick bamboo, ribbon, 
tape, glue, and twine. Indoors, we were assembling an object. 
Additionally, the bank thing components do the same as 
exemplified by data leakage, the focus of this paper. In reality, 
any current bank as an object is a ―livable‖ system to a certain 
degree, but this, by necessity, is an implicit result of its 
functions, and it is a partial ―livability‖.  
For example, leakage in the bank thing is a gathering of 
(sub)things and is viewed as one of the inhabitants of the bank, 
analogous to an octopus in an ecosystem with long arms that 
extend everywhere: employees, computers, desks, and 
cabinets, and so forth. This octopus is hiding until it is 
―brought out‖ by the bank’s thinging. It can cause harm if not 
dealt with holistically. The main result of our case study in the 
next section is exposure of this leakage thing through mapping 
its territories (octopus arms) throughout the bank.  
Such a perspective uncovers many hidden things as bank’s 
dwellers. Our task is identifying these hidden occupiers of the 
bank in its model (diagram), as will be demonstrated by 
recognizing the information leakage thing. This is analogous to 
Wittgenstein’s [27] work about the differences between 
―seeing‖ and ―interpreting‖ (e.g., Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit 
figure), where in our study, assuming that our focus is on 
information leakage, we develop the bank’s TM model, then 
we cut off the leakage machines inside it. This exposition of 
internally hidden machines is used for such purposes as 
constructing preventive measures and conducting forensics.  
The bank as a thing in a modern society encounters ever-
present vulnerability to threats. As a real thing, it is ―a 
complicated machine in which every day something breaks 
down‖ [28]. A real bank is a gathering place that continuously 
calls for an unremitting effort to shore it up in the face of the 
comings and goings of its human inhabitants and nonhuman 
residents, not to mention the focus on security matters [17]. 
Much has been tried through developing a bank system that 
matches the expectations of well-ordered things within its outer 
boundaries; nevertheless, its function depends on the continual 
flow of things across these boundaries. The thingness of a bank 
becomes visible when an interruption or malfunctioning related 
to these flows appears. 
In this paper, we focus on specific control efforts to counter 
the act of making information available without authorization. 
According to Lachniet [4], ―Many controls are best done 
internally, such as creating a formal IT security management 
framework, or identifying the type of data you need to protect.‖ 
As used in this paper, leakage includes spilling, which 
refers to the unintended disclosure of information to 
unauthorized environments, organizations, or people [29]. In 
our study, we will exclude the situation of misconfigured 
systems that permit access to unprotected resources or are 
made available by hackers. 
From the TM perspective, a leakage thing (e.g., information 
leakage) is a flow that spills out of the grand TM machine. This 
implies that a submachine has malfunctioned in the bank. Fig. 
5 shows four possible types of submachine that leak flow from 
(1) received, (2) processed, (3) created, and (4) released 
information. 
In the next section, we will identify all possible 
malfunctioned submachines in the bank used in our case study 
after developing a TM description of certain operations (e.g., 
consumer e-purchases) in the bank. 
 
Fig. 5. Leak flows to leakage machines  
IV. BANK AS A CASE STUDY: CONSUMER E-PURCHASES 
In the existing system of the bank in our case study (and in 
all banks, to the best of our knowledge), no explicit focus is 
given to the issue of information leakage. Such an issue is 
discreetly handled by the security team that deals with matters 
such as detecting hacking, collecting evidence, and the use of 
security tools such as encryption. In such a context, in specific 
leakage cases a possibility exists that the inability to progress 
legally due to a lack of a predesigned amount of evidence 
means the chances of escape for leakers are great.  
To demonstrate the application of FM modeling in the area 
of a leakage of data, we took the following steps:  
 First, we developed complete static and dynamic 
descriptions of the bank TM by focusing on the sample 
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application of e-purchases because of the paper size 
limitation. 
 Then, we exposed leakage machines inside the bank 
TM description. 
  
A. Consumer E-purchase 
As shown in Fig. 6, a customer (upper left corner) clicks on 
an icon on the screen that creates a signal (1) that flows to the 
electronic device software system to be processed (2) and 
triggers the processing (e.g., filling with relevant data) of a 
purchase request (3). Note that the request data is provided by 
the customer selection (click), and the (blank) purchase request 
is already stored in the device. 
The request flows to the merchant server to be validated 
(4), and this triggers the generation of a formatted message (5) 
that flows to the payment gateway server (6). There, it is 
processed (7) to trigger the release of a processed payment 
page (8) according to the given data of the request. The 
payment page flows to the merchant server (9), then flows to 
the customer’s electronic device where it is displayed (10). The 
customer inputs the payment details to trigger the creation of a 
transaction (11), which includes the card data, PIN number, 
and bank ID. 
Fig. 6. The static description of a consumer e-purchase
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To give a further description of how to create the transaction 
machine, Fig. 7 shows a sample of constructing it from clicks 
on the screen, a physical bank card, and a stored value in the 
inputting device. This thing-oriented depiction contrasts with 
the typical object-oriented specification (e.g., in UML), which 
has the mere structure of a class and its attributes.  
 
Fig. 7. Sample description of input 
Continuing with Fig. 6, the transaction (11) is validated 
(processed) in the device browser such that  
 If the input data is invalid (12), then the transaction is 
constructed again, or 
 If the data is valid, then the transaction is encrypted (13) 
and flows to the payment gateway server (14).  
In the payment gateway server, the encrypted transaction is 
received and decrypted (14). Then, the original transaction is 
processed to generate encrypted data without encrypting the 
bank ID (15). The encrypted data is stored into a database, and 
then released to the acquirer bank (16).  
In the acquirer bank, the transaction data is processed into 
decrypted data (17). Then, the transaction flows to the payment 
processing network (18) where it is processed (19) and the 
following can happen:  
 If the transaction is risky or possibly fraudulent, then a 
rejection response is generated (20) and sent to the 
acquirer bank (21) and then to the payment gateway 
server to be processed (22) to release a pre-stored portal 
page response from the database (23). The portal page 
response is transferred to the customer’s device browser 
to be displayed.  
 Returning back to the processing at (19), if the 
transaction in the electronic payment network is not 
considered a risk or possible fraud, then the transaction 
flows to the issuer bank (24) to be processed (25). This 
processing triggers a release of the customer’s current 
balance from the centralized banking database (26) to 
be compared with the transaction amount that is 
received by the acquirer bank (27).  
 If the balance is not sufficient, then a rejection response 
is created (28) and transferred to the electronic payment 
processing network (29), and then it flows to the 
acquirer bank (30), to the payment gateway server (31), 
and to the payment gateway server (32) to trigger a 
release of a pre-stored portal page response that is 
transferred to the customer’s device browser.  
 Going back to the comparison of the balance with the 
transaction cost, if the balance is sufficient, then a new 
balance is calculated (33) and stored in the core banking 
database (34). Additionally, an approval response is 
created (35) and flows across servers to create a success 
page response (36) as described before. 
Fig. 6 gives a static description of a consumer e-purchase. 
To describe its dynamic behavior, we give the following 
events, as illustrated in Fig. 8, which is a copy of Fig. 6 marked 
with regions of events. 
Event 1 (E1): The customer clicks on his/her electronic device 
browser, which is processed by the device. 
Event 2 (E2): A purchase request is sent to the merchant where 
it is validated. 
Event 3 (E3): The merchant sends a formatted message to the 
payment gateway server to be processed. 
Event 4 (E4): The payment gateway server processes a stored 
page and sends it to the customer’s browser through the 
merchant server. 
Event 5 (E5): The portal payment page instructs the customer 
to insert his/her payment details. 
Event 6 (E6): The payment details are inputted and validated in 
the electronic device browser. 
Event 7 (E7): In case it is invalid, the browser requests that the 
customer re-input the correct payment information. 
Event 8 (E8): The electronic device browser encrypts the 
transaction. 
Event 9 (E9): The electronic device browser sends the 
transaction to the payment gateway server where it is 
decrypted. 
Event 10 (E10): The payment gateway server processes the 
decrypted transaction by separating the bank ID. 
Event 11 (E11): The payment gateway server encrypts the 
transaction, except for the bank ID, then stores it into the 
database. 
Event 12 (E12): The encrypted data, with the exception of the 
bank ID, is transferred from the payment gateway server to the 
acquirer bank system, where it is decrypted. 
Event 13 (E13): The decrypted transaction is generated in the 
acquirer bank and transferred to the electronic payment 
processing network, where is processed for possible fraud. 
Event 14 (E14): If the transaction is fraudulent, then a rejection 
response is sent to the acquirer bank. 
Event 15 (E15): The payment gateway server received the 
message from the acquirer bank and processes it. 
Event 16 (E16): The electronic device browser displays the 
rejection message. 
Event 17 (E17): The electronic payment processing network 
sends the transaction to the issuer bank to be processed. 
Event 18 (E18): The issuer bank gets the customer’s current 
balance and processes it against the transaction received. 
Event 19 (E19): If the current balance is not sufficient, then the 
issuer bank generates a rejection response that flows to the 
electronic payment processing network then to the acquirer 
bank. 
Event 20 (E20): If the current balance is sufficient, then the 
issuer bank deducts the requested amount from the customer 
balance. 
Event 21 (E21): The issuer bank generates an approval message 
that flows to the electronic payment processing network then to 
the acquirer bank. 
Event 22 (E22): The electronic device browser displays the 
portal payment success page. 
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Fig. 8. The events of the consumer e-purchase 
V. LEAKAGE SUBMACHINES 
In this section, we will identify all possible leakage 
submachines in the bank. As an example of such identification, 
we focus on the issuer bank, keeping the numbered circles of 
Fig. 6. Fig. 9 shows the selected area for analyzing a data 
leakage. The aim is to model the entire issuing bank as a 
physical environment of the information system that handles 
the transaction data during its life cycle. The analysis can be 
generalized to different areas of consumer e-purchases. 
Accordingly, Fig. 10 shows this expanded representation of 
the issuing bank. The top part of Fig. 10 shows the switch 
server where the transaction data flows from the electronic 
payment network to the issuer bank (24) to be processed (25). 
This processing triggers a release of a customer’s current 
balance from the core database (26) to be compared with the 
transaction amount that is received by the acquirer bank (27). 
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Fig. 9. The selected area for analyzing leakage  
In addition to this main flow that involves the switch server 
and the core database, the server room includes the console, the 
core server, and the local e-mail server. 
In Fig. 10, circles A and B in the server room point to 
possible leakage because the console screen can be captured by 
an employee (e.g., cleaning staff member). 
The IT employee (C) monitors the system activity through 
his/her PC. He/she can access data on the switch server by 
creating an access request that flows to the core server. The 
currently processed transaction is copied and sent as an 
attachment (F) of an e-mail to the IT employee. 
In the employee’s PC (G), it is displayed, flows to the email 
server (F) and then printed (I). Here, there is an opportunity for 
leakage (e.g., by taking a picture or using flash drive). The hard 
copy is sent via a messenger employee to an employee who 
files it. Accordingly, we can describe all possible leakage 
machines, identifying their locations and who activates them. 
An employee can walk out of the bank carrying the data on a 
flash drive or as a hard copy. He/she can use the regular bank 
mail to send it out. These examples illustrate the method of 
identifying all possible leakage machines. 
 To summarize, Fig. 11 shows a general picture of different 
flows. The blue arrows in the figure show legitimate flows of 
the data whereas the red ones indicate leakage. The red flows 
originate from a leakage machines as follows.  
Leakage machine 1 (circle 1): Capturing the console screen 
by an employee who has access to the server room. 
Leakage machine 2 (circle 2): Capturing data from a PC by 
an IT employee using a camera, flash drive, etc. 
Leakage machine 3 (circle 3): Copying data (hard copy) by 
an IT employee. 
Leakage machine 4 (circle 4): Capturing data from a PC by 
a non-IT employee using a camera, flash drive, etc. 
Leakage machine 5 (circle 5): Copying data by a record-
keeping employee. 
Leakage machine 6 (circle 6): Copying data by a 
messenger. 
Leakage machine 7 (circle 7): An employee obtains a hard 
copy in an unauthorized way. 
This thinging approach means that the leakage machine 
stands apart from its bank grand machine and is treated as a 
unified whole. A machine of interest (e.g. leakage) is exposed 
out of the bank thing with further thinging. It would appear as a 
subdiagram, in the forefront, clearly contrasted against the 
ground. This thinging of leakage is an act of "creation" of a 
machine which is already "exits" in reality even though we 
only perceive it when it becomes alive.   
Such a comprehensive picture of data leakage provides the 
basis for planners and security personnel to focus on aspects 
that are suitable for the required prevention level. Additionally, 
it furnishes a foundation for any forensic investigation.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper sought to accomplish two aims: present a 
systematic conceptual framework for the leakage and to 
develop that in the context of experimentation with TM as a 
new methodology in modeling. The TM model of the bank 
demonstrates the viability of the TM model.  
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The TM diagrams may look complex; however, they can be 
simplified by lumping the details together or omitting stages 
according to requirements. Many issues remain to be clarified; 
however, this paper demonstrates the potential feasibility of 
this approach. 
 
Fig. 10. Description of the flow of data and its physical environment 
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Fig. 11. A general picture of possible leakage in the example 
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